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Abstract 
 
Robert Kagan’s provocative thesis of ‘Venus and Mars’ posited America and Europe at 
two diametrically opposed strategic poles. However, this paper argues that Democracy 
Promotion is an area with the potential for intensive US-EU cooperation beyond ‘Venus 
and Mars’. Democracy Promotion is a key concept in the EU’s as well as US foreign 
policy discourse and practice. Both EU and US rhetoric hint at a belief in the logic of the 
Democratic Peace thesis. While the EU and the US lack comprehensive Democracy 
Promotion strategies, it is nevertheless possible to discern distinctive approaches to 
Democracy Promotion that reveal both convergences and divergences between the 
EU and the US. It is most likely that enhanced coordination on the strategic, political, 
policy and even operational levels might emerge as a middle ground between even 
less cooperation (and more independence in Democracy Promotion endeavours), on 
the one hand, and a full-fledged joint Transatlantic Democracy Promotion Agenda, on 
the other. 
 
 Martin Konstantin Köhring 
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Introduction: the EU, the US and Democracy Promotion 
 
“Democracy is the cornerstone of the Bush Administration’s foreign 
policy, and is key to a peaceful and prosperous future.”1 
(Paula J. Dobriansky, US Under Secretary for Democracy and 
Global Affairs) 
 
“I want to emphasize our shared commitment to promoting 
democracy, freedom all over the world. […] And that's one of the 
fields where I see that the United States and European Union can 
do, and should do, even more together.”2 
(Commission President José Manuel Barroso) 
 
These statements by leading foreign policy actors of the EU and the US reflect a shared 
interest across the Atlantic in Democracy Promotion as a strategy to contribute to 
global peace. It also reflects a widely held belief that there is an important causal link 
between democracy within states and peace among states. On the academic level, 
this belief is reflected in the so-called Democratic Peace thesis.3 On the policy level, it is 
represented by numerous policy statements and documents such as the US and 
European security strategies. The Democratic Peace thesis can be seen as an 
approach to world security that binds America and Europe together. However, talking 
about an approach to world security that unites America and Europe has not been en 
vogue in recent years – especially not in the heyday of the rhetoric of a transatlantic 
divide in strategic thinking, epitomised by Robert Kagan’s claim that “America is from 
Mars and Europe is from Venus”4. When Kagan published his provocative article ‘Power 
and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently’ in The 
Policy Review in June/July 2002, the first tensions over the looming invasion of Iraq had 
already started to strain transatlantic relations. Kagan’s argument is built around the 
notion that Europe’s relative military weakness compels it to use fundamentally different 
                                                 
1    Paula J. Dobriansky, Remarks to the Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., 20 June 2005, 
www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2005/48394.htm [31 March 2007]. 
2    José Manuel Barroso, EU-US Summit Press Conference, Vienna, 21 June 2006, 
ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_06/index.htm [31 March 2007]. 
3    The Democratic Peace Thesis is sometimes also referred to as the Liberal Peace Thesis. 
Democratic Peace and Liberal Peace will be used interchangeably. See on this Dieter 
Mahncke, ‘A New World Order?’. In The Law of International Relations, edited by August 
Reinisch and Ursula Kriebaum. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2007, pp. 211-227. 
4   Robert Kagan, ‘Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe See the World 
Differently’, Policy Review, No. 113, 2002, p. 3. EU Diplomacy Papers 5/2007 
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foreign policy tools than America. According to Kagan’s thesis, the transatlantic gap is 
widening both in terms of ideology and in terms of capabilities. But Kagan and others 
who have written about the subject fail to explain why Democracy Promotion is 
becoming more and more important on the transatlantic agenda, exemplified, for 
example, by the intensified transatlantic ‘Dialogue on Democracy Promotion’. Hence, a 
systematic approach is needed to identify the convergences and divergences in the 
approaches of the US and the EU towards Democracy Promotion. The focus will be on 
illuminating the bases for transatlantic cooperation on Democracy Promotion. 
 
In official US government publications, democracy is often explicitly mentioned, 
whereas the EU is often regarded as a “reluctant debutante” in the promotion of 
democracy. 5   Democracy Promotion can be “understood as a cooperative 
international effort designed to strengthen [...] the democratic process”, including 
support for free, fair, and competitive elections, for independent media, for the rule of 
law and an independent judiciary, for defending human rights and the fundamental 
freedoms of expression, conscience, and association and for civil society.6  
 
This paper asks to what extent the EU and the US can cooperate meaningfully on global 
Democracy Promotion. It argues that the historical experience of Democracy Promotion 
has been very different on the two sides of the Atlantic. While the US can look back at a 
long tradition based on a ‘liberal grand strategy’ of Democracy Promotion, the 
Europeans have no such tradition even though some thinkers such as Kant have left 
their mark on Europe. The Democratic Peace thesis is nevertheless shared across the 
Atlantic as an important influence on Democracy Promotion. Enhanced coordination 
on the strategic, political, policy and even operational levels might be possible despite 
major reservations, for example about the use of force. 
 
 
                                                 
5    Michael Emerson et al., ‘The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as Promoter of 
Democracy in its Neighbourhood’, CEPS Working Documents, No. 223, Brussels, 2005. 
6    Carl Gershman and Michael Allen, ‘The Assault on Democracy Assistance’, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2006, pp. 49-50. Martin Konstantin Köhring 
  6
Theoretical, Conceptual and Historical Bases of Democracy Promotion in US and 
EU Foreign Policies 
 
Democracy Promotion as America’s ‘Liberal Grand Strategy’ 
Notions of Democracy Promotion and of a Democratic Peace are recurrent themes in 
US foreign policy rhetoric. In the 2004 State of the Union address, President Bush stated 
that “America is a Nation with a mission. [...] Our aim is a democratic peace – a peace 
founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman”.7 In conformity with this, 
the latest US National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasises that “because democracies 
are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is 
the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing 
regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending 
peace and prosperity”. 8   “Enhancing the role of democracies and democracy 
promotion throughout international and multilateral institutions” is explicitly spelled out 
as a foreign policy objective in the NSS. This focus on the relationship between 
Democracy Promotion and the extension of global peace, though, is not a new 
phenomenon in US foreign policy. On the contrary, Ikenberry regards Democracy 
Promotion as an “American liberal grand strategy” that has been more dominant at 
some points in US history than at others but, in any case, it has provided a more or less 
coherent liberal orientation throughout US history. 9   The following paragraphs will 
highlight the continuity of this tradition. 
 
Throughout history American foreign policy has been informed substantially by the 
Democratic Peace thesis. In the discipline of International Relations (IR), liberal thinking 
on military power is largely based on the notion of a ‘perpetual peace’ elaborated in 
                                                 
7    The White House, ‘State of the Union Address’, 20 January 2004, www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html [31 March 2007]. 
8   The White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, March 
2006, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf [4 April 2007]. 
9   G. John Ikenberry, ‘America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in 
the Post-War Era’. In American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, 
edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000, pp. 103-104. EU Diplomacy Papers 5/2007 
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Immanuel Kant’s seminal book.10  Kant put forward the idea that a federal contract 
b e t w e e n  s t a t e s  a b o l i s h i n g  w a r  ( a  ‘ p a c i f i c  f e d e r a t i o n ’ )  s h o u l d  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d . 11 The 
Democratic Peace thesis assumes that democratic states do not go to war with each 
other but might be aggressive towards non-liberal states.12 A prosperous and peaceful 
‘zone of peace’ in the West is contrasted to an impoverished and conflict-ridden ‘zone 
of war’ in the rest of the world.13 Hence, in order to create peaceful relations among 
states and diminish the role of military power, the Democratic Peace thesis advocates 
the spread of liberal democratic institutions such as multiparty democracy, market 
economies, free trade and human rights as the “best prescription for international 
peace”.14 
 
From the start, the use of force in the name of Democracy Promotion was seen as a 
valid option in the US grand strategy – as the example of the Monroe Doctrine and the 
Roosevelt corollary illustrate. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 provided the conceptual 
basis of Democracy Promotion in Central and Latin America. It was designed to keep 
the European imperial powers away from the American continent’s affairs. The notion of 
defending democracy against an outside threat (in this case: imperialist Europe) set the 
scene for future US Democracy Promotion. The offensive variant of the Monroe Doctrine 
is the 1904 Roosevelt corollary of the doctrine. It attempted to justify US intervention in 
Central and Latin America on the grounds of mismanagement (or so-called ‘chronic 
wrongdoing’).15  
 
                                                 
10   Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, edited with an introduction by Lewis White Beck. New 
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957 [1795]. 
11   Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991, pp. 102ff. 
12   Bruce  Russett,  Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 11. 
13    Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, ‘Introduction: The International Relations of Democracy, 
Liberalism, and War’. In Democracy, Liberalism, and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace 
Debate, edited by Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2001, p. 1. 
14   Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), Debating the Democratic 
Peace: An International Security Reader. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996, p. xiii. 
15    Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. 
London: Penguin, 1998, pp. 336-337. Martin Konstantin Köhring 
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Under the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), these ideas were further 
developed under the slogan ‘making the world safe for democracy’.16 Wilson made the 
spread of democracy to prevent a repetition of the horrors of World War I a central 
theme of his foreign policy. Resembling Kant’s call for a ‘permanent peace treaty’, 
Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ called for the creation of an international institution to 
regulate international anarchy in order to secure peace among nations. The League of 
Nations would later become the embodiment of Wilson’s suggestions.17 Wilson regarded 
America as an exceptional nation with a unique global mission for the spread of 
democracy.18 Wilsonianism has influenced Wilson’s successors – some more than others 
– but Wilson’s attempt to relate American exceptionalism and Pax Americana to the 
Democratic Peace has become very influential in US foreign policy.  
 
Even during the Cold War, the debate over Democratic Peace and the benefits of 
Democracy Promotion in US foreign policy endured through the controversies over 
Carter’s democratisation agenda and the birth of the neo-conservative movement in 
the early 1980s. References to the insights of the thesis were frequently used by 
American policy makers, including Ronald Reagan and Jeane Kirkpatrick. The neo-
c o n s e r va t i v e  K ir k p a tr ic k  a r g ue d  in  1 9 7 9  th a t r ig h t- w in g  d ic ta to r s h ip s ,  e s p ec ia l l y  th o s e 
allied with the US, had better prospects for democratisation than left-wing, pro-Soviet 
dictatorships19 – a thesis that would later become known as the ‘Kirkpatrick Doctrine’. 
The doctrine contrasted to the Carter administration’s call for “democracy in all nations, 
not just non-communist autocracies”.20 
 
By the early 1990s, the Democratic Peace thesis had gained a new impetus through 
Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ proposition, Huntington’s observation of a ‘third wave of 
                                                 
16   Tony Smith, America’s Mission: the United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy 
in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 84ff. 
17   Scott Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005, p. 46. 
18   Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right. New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1996, pp. 113-114. 
19    Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, ‘Dictatorships & Double Standards’, Commentary, November 1979, 
www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.aip?id=6189&page=all [4 April 
2007]. 
20   James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. New York: Viking, 2004, 
p. 92, quoted in: International Relations Center, IRC Right Web Program, ‘Profile: Jeane 
Kirkpatrick (1926-2006)’, rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1250 [4 April 2007]. EU Diplomacy Papers 5/2007 
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democratisation’ and increasing literature on the thesis itself. President Clinton’s 
Democracy Promotion policy was based on the concept of ‘democratic enlargement’. 
This approach to Democratic Peace was intrinsically linked to the idea that political 
liberalism and economic liberalism go hand in hand. He has been labelled as a 
‘pragmatic crusader’ because he regarded Democracy Promotion as a policy 
instrument to advance American power, especially America’s economic interests, 
“rather than as a moral duty”.21 
 
Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, adopted a more military-minded concept of the 
Democratic Peace. Pre-emptive attacks by democratic states against anticipated 
threats from non-democracies are explicitly sanctioned by leading Democratic Peace 
theorists22 – a concept which is strikingly similar to the Bush doctrines of preventive war 
and regime change as outlined for example in the NSS of 2002.23  Insofar, the ‘Bush 
Doctrine’ includes the possibility of the use of military force against non-democracies as 
part of the Democratic Peace thesis and thus forms part of the Bush concept of 
Democracy Promotion. 
 
The Lack of a ‘Grand Liberal Tradition’ of Democracy Promotion in Europe 
Europe cannot look back at a ‘grand liberal tradition’ of Democracy Promotion. In the 
European tradition, notions of democracy and its association with peace existed mainly 
in the sphere of ideas – unlike in the case of the US where they also entered the 
doctrinal and practical policy dimensions. This ideational tradition in Europe put 
democracy and freedom at the centre of European philosophical thought, such as in 
the writings of Kant, Grotius, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau. In the case of the US, 
the idea of Democracy Promotion became a recurrent theme in foreign policy 
discourse. In the European case, it was rather the opposite – the spread of colonialism 
and authoritarianism – that dominated European history up to the 20th century despite 
                                                 
21    Michael Cox, ‘Wilsonianism Resurgent? The Clinton Administration and the Promotion of 
Democracy’. In American Democracy Promotion. Impulses, Strategies and Impacts, edited 
by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
228ff. 
22   See, for example, Russett, op.cit., p. 32. 
23    The White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, 
September 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [3 April 2007]. Martin Konstantin Köhring 
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the thinkers of the enlightenment. Thus, three factors complicate a comparative study 
of EU and US Democracy Promotion approaches: (1) the US is a state, while the EU is a 
sui generis organisation; (2) the short history of the EC/EU explains why the US and the EU 
Democracy Promotion strategies and policies start from very different historical positions; 
and (3) the lack of a ‘liberal grand strategy’ of Democracy Promotion in Europe makes 
the EU a “reluctant debutante”.24 Nonetheless, concepts of Democracy Promotion can 
be found in the European context. 
 
In his ‘Power and Weakness’, Kagan argues that Europe has entered a “post-historical 
paradise of peace”, indicating the “realisation of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’”.25 Karen 
Smith acknowledges that the spread of democracy in European foreign policy “broadly 
accords with the democratic peace proposition: democracies don’t fight each other, 
therefore promoting democracy is a peace strategy”.26 
 
Beside Kant, Hugo Grotius has influenced contemporary European notions of 
Democracy Promotion. Grotius was a Dutch diplomat and philosopher, whose ground-
breaking book Laws of War and Peace ( 1 6 2 5 )  i s  s e e n  a s  “ a  f o u n d i n g  t e x t ”  o f  
international law.27 The emergence of the EU as a unifying organisation in Europe based 
on integration and multilateral cooperation has brought with it an emerging concept of 
Democracy Promotion that is based on both the Kantian and Grotian legacies. Both the 
EU Treaty (TEU) and the EC Treaty (TEC) underline the EU’s fundamental attachment to 
the principle of democracy and its consolidation worldwide, relating it to good 
governance, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and strengthening the 
global order. Article 6 TEU states that “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law”. 
Article 11 relates to Democracy Promotion, stressing the objective to “develop and 
consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”. Article 177, para 2 TEC in Title XX (Development Cooperation), 
                                                 
24   Emerson et al., op.cit. 
25   Kagan, Power and Weakness, op.cit., p. 3. 
26    Karen E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Cambridge: Polity, 
2003, p. 130. 
27    Robert Jackson, ‘The Evolution of International Society’. In The Globalization of World 
Politics: an Introduction to International Relations, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 43. EU Diplomacy Papers 5/2007 
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states that “Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of 
developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”. Derived from these articles, the legal basis for EU 
Democracy Promotion foresees the promotion of democracy in conjunction with the 
interlinked issues of promotion of the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
 
Democracy Promotion in the European context is also connected to the preservation of 
global order, most notably in the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003: 
The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic 
states.  Spreading good governance, supporting social and political 
reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule 
of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening 
the international order.28 
 
Thus, in the EU’s emerging foreign policy Kantian notions of Democratic Peace are 
intrinsically linked to two additional IR concepts: Grotian notions of the rule of law and a 
preoccupation with safeguarding international order, as is often reflected in the works 
of the English School of IR. The international society approach of the English School and 
the Grotian notion of the rule of law are clearly spelled out in the EU’s preference for 
‘effective multilateralism’ in the ESS which calls for a “stronger international society, well 
functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order”.29 Thus,  EU 
Democracy Promotion is connected, already on the conceptual level, to the overriding 
principles of the rule of law, good governance and the maintenance of international 
order. 
 
The acknowledgement of a connection between democracy and peace can be 
found in the EU’s notion of ‘structural stability’, which addresses the root causes of 
conflict. Democracy is mentioned as one of the characteristics of ‘structural stability’ 
along with sustainable economic development, respect for human rights, viable 
                                                 
28    European Security Strategy, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, 12 December 2003, 
ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, p. 16. 
29   Ibid., p. 14. Martin Konstantin Köhring 
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political structures, healthy environmental and social conditions and the capacity to 
manage change without resort to conflict.30  ‘Preventive engagement’, a concept 
taken from the ESS,31 is the policy counterpart to the concept of ‘structural stability’. 
 
The European Commission has integrated a key section on ‘Support for democracy, the 
rule of law and civil society’ in its Communication on Conflict Prevention.32 It can thus be 
argued that the concepts of ‘structural stability’ and ‘preventive engagement’ reflect 
conceptual translations of the Democratic Peace proposition. However, in the EU 
context, the concept of Democratic Peace is firmly embedded within the EU’s conflict 
prevention strategy – the use of force to promote democracy is not foreseen. Instead, 
the Commission document envisages a very limited role for military instruments in this 
regard: “the new civilian and military crisis-management tools currently being 
developed in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) could be 
used to deal with the earliest stages of incipient conflict. Though initially designed for 
crisis management they could be just as effective in a preventive, ‘pre-crisis’ role.”33 
 
Bridging the Transatlantic Gap: Robert Cooper and the ‘New Liberal Imperialism’ 
The transatlantic gap on the conceptual level with regard to Democratic Peace can 
be bridged by Robert Cooper’s call for a new European approach to military force – 
one that resembles US assertiveness. Cooper accepts, in principle, Kagan’s premises 
about European weakness and the resulting implications for the role of military power.34 
But he focuses more on a grand strategy (the so-called ‘new liberal imperialism’35) to 
push Europe into becoming a military power. He distinguishes between a post-modern 
‘zone of peace’, which includes Europe, and a pre-modern ‘zone of chaos’. According 
to Cooper, a new kind of imperialism is needed which entails that the “efficient and 
                                                 
30   European  Commission,  Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, 
COM(2001) 211 final, 11 April 2001, p. 10. 
31   European Security Strategy, op.cit., p. 18. 
32   European  Commission,  Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, 
op.cit., p. 13. 
33   Ibid., p. 24. 
34   Robert  Cooper,  The  Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century. 
London: Atlantic, 2003, p. 157. 
35   The Observer, ‘The New Liberal Imperialism’, 7 April 2002. EU Diplomacy Papers 5/2007 
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well-governed export stability and liberty” to the ‘zone of chaos’.36 Kagan, commenting 
on Cooper, claims that “the application of the European miracle to the rest of the world 
has become Europe's new mission civilisatrice”. 37  Therefore,  Cooper’s  influential 
publications on the ‘new liberal imperialism’ might function as a bridge between the 
more assertive US conceptualisation of the Democratic Peace and the more reluctant 
EU conceptualisation. 
 
Democracy Promotion Policies and Tools 
 
US and EU Approaches to Democracy Promotion 
“Both the EU and the US want to increase the number of 
democracies around the world. We may bring somewhat different 
approaches to the table and use different language than our 
American friends. But human rights, good governance and the rule 
of law go hand-in-hand with democracy and freedom. As long as 
our respective strategies reinforce each other - and they do - this 
pluralism in promoting democracy is a source of strength.”38 
(Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary-
General of the Council of the European Union) 
 
Solana’s statement reflects a tacit understanding that the US and the EU have different 
but reinforcing Democracy Promotion strategies. It is noteworthy that neither the US – 
despite its long Democracy Promotion tradition – nor the EU have unified, coherent 
Democracy Promotion strategies and actors. US governmental actors include the White 
House, the State Department and US Embassies, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and 
Congress. The National Endowment for Democracy is a semi-governmental Democracy 
Promotion actor, whereas NGOs such as the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace can be regarded as non-governmental Democracy Promotion actors. The 
situation is similar on the EU side. There is no such thing as an EU strategy on Democracy 
Promotion. However, Mário Rui Queiró from the EuropeAid Co-operation Office 
                                                 
36    Robert Cooper, ‘The Post-Modern State’. In Re-Ordering the World: The Long-term 
Implications of September 11th, edited by Mark Leonard. London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 
2002, pp. 16-17. 
37   Robert Kagan, ‘The Healer’, The Observer, 3 March 2003. 
38    Javier Solana, ‘Europe's Leading Role in the Spread of Democracy’, Financial Times, 14 
March 2005, see also www.ft.com/cms/s/8acbf0c6-942d-11d9-9d6e-00000e2511c8.html [31 
March 2007]. Martin Konstantin Köhring 
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underlined that, for practical purposes, there is an “EC/EU Strategy for Democracy 
Promotion” that derives from various different sources such as the EU and EC Treaties, 
the EU-ACP Partnership and other practical cooperation arrangements.39 Nevertheless, 
the EU recognises that there is need for spelling out an EU approach to Democracy 
Promotion. Therefore, an unofficial ‘food for thought’ paper on the EU approach to 
Democracy Promotion has been floating around in EU institutions since 2006 which 
stresses that democracy should be regarded as a long-term, locally driven process. The 
paper was written by the Policy Unit of the Council General Secretariat and the 
Commission. Interestingly, it was prepared “in accordance with the PSC [Political and 
Security Committee] conclusions of 31.01.06 relating to the EU-US dialogue on 
democracy promotion”.40 This seems to indicate that EU-US coordination of Democracy 
Promotion efforts can be seen as one of the triggers for the EU’s renewed interest in 
establishing its own Democracy Promotion approach.  
 
As both the EU and the US lack comprehensive Democracy Promotion strategies, it 
might be best to look at the different Democracy Promotion tools and instruments that 
can be clearly identified. The unofficial ‘food for thought paper’ mentions a whole list of 
possible Democracy Promotion instruments from which the following categories of 
Democracy Promotion tools can be discerned: political dialogue and diplomatic 
measures; multilateral initiatives; economic and financial incentives; conditionalities and 
sanctions; military mobilisation and intervention; and democracy aid programmes.  
 
Political Dialogue and Diplomatic Measures 
On the EU side, the political dialogue with countries such as Russia and China is crucial 
because of the difficulties of engaging in small-scale civil society projects in these 
countries. The core interests and values on which the EU-Russia strategic partnership is 
based include “democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market economy 
                                                 
39    Interview with Mr. Mário Rui Queiró, official of the European Commission, DG RELEX, 
EuropeAid Co-operation Office, Brussels, 30 April 2007. 
40   Council of the EU, ‘The EU Approach To Democracy Promotion in External Relations’, ‘Food 
For Thought’ Council of EU PSC Discussion Paper, 21 June 2006, 
www.democracyagenda.org/modules.php?mop=modload&name=Upload&file=index&op
=getit&fid=15 [31 March 2007]. EU Diplomacy Papers 5/2007 
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principles”.41 There are twice-yearly human rights consultations that address these issues. 
As far as US Democracy Promotion towards Russia is concerned, the US emphasises a 
strong pro-democratic rhetoric that creates high expectations both on the part of the 
US and on the part of the partner. This “overexpansive rhetoric”42 on  Democracy 
Promotion has had negative consequences for the US political dialogue on Democracy 
Promotion as, in most cases, these high expectations have not been fulfilled. Another 
tenet of US Democracy Promotion, especially with regard to political dialogue, is the 
association of democracy with a particular leader. This ‘great leader approach’43 puts 
persons before structures and institutions – unlike the EU that emphasises ‘structural 
stability’ and long-term capacity and institution-building . 
 
The policy of ‘positive engagement’ towards China is another high-profile case of 
political dialogue that contributes to Democracy Promotion in the long run. The EU 
approach to China has been characterised as promoting a “rules-based economy” 
first, with a focus firmly on ‘good governance’ rather than democratic reform per se.44 
As a consequence, the EU-China dialogue on human rights was initiated in 1996 at the 
political level. This emphasis on narrow human rights and good governance issues rather 
than an overarching Democracy Promotion strategy succeeded in engaging the 
Chinese authorities who did not feel threatened by the incremental EU approach. US 
rhetoric on China, however, often appeared to undermine the Chinese political system 
as such and displayed China as a strategic rival. For that reason, “in light of this 
difference [...] Chinese officials stated in private that they were more willing to grant 
access to European than to US good governance and human rights assistance”.45  
 
EU-US efforts to coordinate the political dialogue with countries in democratic transition 
have been intensified in recent years. The 2007 US-EU Summit emphasised the progress 
                                                 
41    European Commission, ‘The EU’s Relations with Russia’, ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
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43   Ibid., p. 35. 
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made on coordinating efforts in intensifying the political dialogues with Russia and 
Central Asian countries on democracy and human rights.46 
 
A recent example of a practical diplomatic measure shows the difficulties of the EU and 
the US even to cooperate on the political level. In August 2006 the US and the EU had 
planned a joint démarche on the Belarusian authorities' disrespect for international 
standards of democracy and human rights. However, the requested high-level meetings 
with the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus were refused.47 The 
Belarusian authorities apparently rejected cooperation with the US while they 
welcomed the EU efforts.48  Hence, EU-US cooperation on Democracy Promotion, in 
particular circumstances, can have a detrimental effect on the EU’s ability to engage in 
meaningful political dialogue with a third country. Moreover, the US Democracy 
Promotion policy is sometimes accused of double standards. As a corollary to the 
‘Kirkpatrick Doctrine’, the US often tends to support regimes that cooperate on counter-
terrorism despite their record on democracy, for example Pakistan. Therefore, US 
Democracy Promotion is embedded within a “stronger geo-strategic dynamic, 
compared to the more prominent development-based logic conditioning European 
approaches”.49 
 
Multilateral Initiatives 
By contrast, most of the recent Democracy Promotion initiatives in multilateral fora 
originated from successful EU-US coordination. The EU and the US have collaborated 
successfully on priorities for the Human Rights Council. They also co-sponsored UN 3rd 
Committee resolutions on Belarus, Burma, Iran and North Korea and worked together in 
the bodies of the Peace Building Commission.50 EU-US coordination was pivotal in the 
creation of the UN Democracy Fund that gives grants mostly to pro-democracy civil 
                                                 
46   The White House, ‘2007 U.S.-EU Summit Political Progress Report’, www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/ 
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society organisations around the world. 51   A further example of successful EU-US 
Democracy Promotion cooperation in multilateral initiatives is the ‘Broader Middle East 
and North Africa Initiative’ launched by the G8. It is a multilateral development and 
reform plan aimed at fostering economic and political liberalisation in Arab and non-
Arab Muslim countries.52 These examples illustrate the large extent to which transatlantic 
cooperation on multilateral initiatives is growing.  
 
Economic and Financial Incentives, Conditionalities and Sanctions 
In the 1990s, the EU introduced a standard human rights and democracy clause into its 
treaties with third countries as a means to facilitate the application of political 
conditionality in its external relations. 53   Trade and cooperation agreements, aid, 
association agreements and finally EU membership were made conditional on criteria 
such as the adherence to democratic standards, human rights and the rule of law.54 In 
cases of alleged violations against the conditions, the EU normally initiates a 
complicated consultation procedure. In contrast, the US has been more willing to 
suspend democracy aid to uncooperative third countries altogether. Therefore, the US is 
seen as more capable of quick responses to disruptions in democratic transition 
countries, whereas the EU is more “attuned to assisting the background conditions to 
political reform over a longer period of time, including the construction of genuine 
‘consent’ to the value of democratic norms”.55 
 
Moreover, the US does not shy away from imposing unilateral measures if it sees the 
peaceful transition to a representative democracy threatened, for example unilateral 
sanctions against Cuba based on the Helms-Burton Act.56 The EU reacted negatively to 
the Helms-Burton Act and introduced a Council Regulation declaring the extra-territorial 
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provisions of the Act to be unenforceable within the Union.57 In the aftermath of the US-
EU settlement of the controversies arising from Helms-Burton Act, USAID and EuropeAid 
established a list of shared principles on the use of sanctions. Yet, “the sanctions were 
interpreted in differing ways, the EU seeing them as limiting the use of punitive measures, 
the US emphasizing their role in placing more stringent conditions on trade and 
investment with rogue regimes.”58 Despite these differences in the use of conditionalities 
and sanctions, there are some joint sanction regimes, for example travel restrictions and 
targeted financial sanctions against members of the Lukashenko regime of Belarus.59  
 
Military Force  
Possibly the most controversial topic on the Democracy Promotion agenda is whether 
the use of force can be employed to promote democracy. In the Commission’s view, 
democracy cannot be imposed but has to be built from within.60 When  President 
George W. Bush placed Democracy Promotion at the centre of his second-term 
agenda in 2005, much of the European public and many European leaders started to 
see US Democracy Promotion “as a repackaged commitment to the unilateral use of 
force as well as justification for a war and occupation that were not going as smoothly 
as expected”.61 Any additional unilateral attempts to democratise the Middle East by 
force could lead to “further, and still more damaging breakdowns in the solidarity 
required for transatlantic co-operation” in Democracy Promotion. 62  Even  though 
Democracy Promotion is usually not the only reason for US military intervention (as in the 
case of Iraq) the US has advocated the use of force as a Democracy Promotion tool 
                                                 
57   Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of 
the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based 
thereon or resulting therefrom, Official Journal L 309, 29.11.1996, 0001-0006. 
58   Youngs, ‘Democracy Promotion’, op.cit., p. 50. 
59   The White House, ‘2007 U.S.-EU Summit Political Progress Report’, op.cit. 
60   Interview with an official of the European Commission, DG RELEX, Brussels, 7 May 2007. 
61    Jeffrey Kopstein, ‘The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion’, The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2006, p. 85. 
62    Laurence Whitehead, ‘Europe, Transatlantic Co-operation, and Democratization’, paper 
presented at the workshop on Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: EU and US 
Strategies and Instruments, Stanford University, 4/5 October 2004, iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/ 
20742/Whitehead-_Europe_Transatlantic_Cooperation_and_Democratization.pdf [3 April 
2007]. EU Diplomacy Papers 5/2007 
  19
before, for example in the case of US attempts to galvanise  UN support for the 
intervention to restore democracy in Haiti.63 
 
The EU, on the other hand, prefers civilian to coercive military measures to protect 
human rights and democracy. However, as mentioned above, the ESDP could involve 
the use of civilian and military mobilisation in a ‘pre-crisis’ situation as part of a 
comprehensive conflict prevention strategy.64 
 
Democracy Aid Programmes 
Democracy aid (or democracy assistance) is designed to “foster a democratic opening 
in a nondemocratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has 
experienced a democratic opening”. 65  Aid is typically directed towards elections, 
political parties, constitutions, judiciaries, police, legislatures, local government, militaries, 
nongovernmental civic advocacy groups, civic education organisations, trade unions 
and media organisations. 
 
The enlargement process is the first and the oldest (indirect) Democracy Promotion tool 
of the EU. At the Copenhagen European Council meeting in June 1993, the so-called 
‘Copenhagen criteria’ were formulated, including the requirement that the candidate 
country must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”.66  The EU’s pre-
accession instruments often turned out to be key factors in Democracy Promotion. 
 
The PHARE programme67 was one of the three pre-accession instruments financed by 
the EU to assist the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in their efforts to 
prepare for EU membership. In effect since 1989, the programme focused on institution-
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building as well as economic and social cohesion.68  Its sister programme TACIS69 was 
launched in 1991, providing grant-financed technical assistance to twelve countries of 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Both programmes focused on EU cooperation with 
governments. In addition, the PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme, initiated in 
1992, was specifically designed to support non-governmental organisations.70 On  1 
January 2007 a new Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance came into force, bringing 
together all previous pre-accession support programmes into one single instrument.71 
 
A derivative from the accession process – the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) 
– as well as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) encompass democracy 
assistance elements, too. The ENP offers a set of neighbouring countries from Eastern 
Europe and the Southern Mediterranean a ‘stake’ in the EU’s single market and closer 
cooperation on other EU programmes in return for democratic reforms. A ‘Governance 
Facility’ provides additional financial aid to those countries that want to go further in 
strengthening the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights.72 New financial 
support is available through a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI), which adds new impetus to the democracy assistance agenda.73 
 
The SAP is an integrated, long-term approach to conflict prevention in the Western 
Balkans, in line with the notion of ‘preventive engagement’ discussed above. A policy 
mix of aid, trade concessions and the prospect for eventual EU membership is used to 
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keep countries from the Western Balkans on the road towards democratic transition.74 
The Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) 
Programme has underpinned the objectives and mechanisms of the SAP.75 
 
The European Parliament has a particularly strong record in advocating democracy 
and human rights in European foreign policy despite its limited competence in this area. 
It took the initiative in 1991 to propose a separate ‘democracy line’ of support in the EU 
budget to finance a new European Fund for the promotion of civil society and 
democratisation. Five million ECU of the PHARE budget were set aside for this purpose. A 
‘European Democracy Initiative’ was set up in 1992 on the initiative of the European 
Parliament, extending the Democracy Promotion programme for CEECs to other parts 
of the world, including Latin America and the ACP countries.76  More recently, the 
Parliament used its budgetary powers to implement the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) – a special budget line for Democracy 
Promotion, especially civil society projects. EIDHR is part of the thematic projects of the 
EuropeAid Cooperation Office (complementing the geographical projects that focus 
on particular regions). 77   EIDHR confirms the EU’s holistic Democracy Promotion 
approach that treats democracy and human rights and their respective promotion 
strategies as “two sides of the same coin”.78 
 
The EU has adopted a regional, multilateral focus for democracy assistance projects. 
The US, on the other hand, often stepped outside the confines of regional organisations 
such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) “to adopt unilateral measures in a 
way that the EU declined to do”.79 Whereas the EU concentrates on local ownership in 
its democracy aid programmes, the US often supports high profile initiatives which are 
sometimes insensitive to local conditions using “replica features of American 
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democracy” (strong checks and balances, two moderate parties, privately owned 
media, decentralised union bargaining) as the model for a democracy.80  
 
Both the EU and the US have set up institutional mechanisms to coordinate their 
respective democracy aid efforts more effectively. Within the European Commission, 
the EuropeAid Cooperation Office was set up in 2001 to coordinate the EU’s external 
aid programmes, with the unit on Governance, Democracy, Human Rights and Gender 
dealing specifically with Democracy Promotion issues. As far as the US is concerned, an 
Interagency Working Group on Democracy was set up under President Clinton in order 
to coordinate different elements of democracy-related strategy in the State 
Department and USAID.81 USAID has also developed a sub-office for Democracy and 
Governance.82 
 
USAID started its intensive democracy assistance programme in Central and Latin 
America in the 1980s, initially as part of the Reagan Administration’s support for anti-
communist regimes, but then more generally to foster the democratic transition in the 
countries of the region. This included sponsoring electoral assistance and rule-of-law 
aid.83 By the end of the 1980s, USAID had expanded its democratic aid programmes to 
the rest of the world. With the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, though, 
the emphasis of USAID Democracy Promotion shifted towards democratic transition in 
the CEECs and the states from the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Ukraine.84 
There is a clear overlap with similar EU programmes, including PHARE and TACIS. In the 
1990s, USAID started to fund electoral assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa.85 In this respect, 
both the EU and US programmes have been based on a similar strategic goal 
(supporting the post-communist democratic transitions), geographic focus areas (Sub-
Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Russia) and democracy assistance tools 
(particularly electoral assistance). In fact, there seems to be ideal ground for 
cooperation in electoral assistance. Nonetheless, USAID has recognised a lack of 
                                                 
80   Ibid., p. 49. 
81   Ibid., p. 46. 
82   Markus Thiel, ‘The Conditionality of U.S. & E.U. Development Aid upon Democratization – A 
Comparison’, €-Working Papers, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, pp. 3-4. 
83   Carothers, op.cit., p. 184. 
84   Ibid., p. 185. 
85   Ibid. EU Diplomacy Papers 5/2007 
  23
operational cooperation in electoral assistance and seeks at least a limited level of 
coordination with the EU.86 But this often does not work in practice. The EU prefers to 
carry out electoral assistance missions independently – other actors such as the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) may operate as ‘service providers’ to the EU, 
for example through the provision of technical equipment.87  In the elections in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in April 2006, there was no cooperation with the US on 
the operational level despite some coordination on the political level.88  
 
Political foundations and NGOs are also active Democracy Promotion actors. On the US 
side, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created as a governmentally 
funded but privately operated organisation devoted to Democracy Promotion in 1983.89 
NED has initiated a network of publicly funded but non-governmental associations 
dedicated to Democracy Promotion – the Network of Democracy Assistance 
Foundations – under the umbrella of the World Movement for Democracy. The network 
consists of foundations such as the large German foundations (Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung), the 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy.90 NED and most of the other mainly European and American foundations in 
the network have been especially effective in Democracy Promotion projects that 
involved the so-called ‘first-in’ funding, i.e. the provision of start-up assistance to 
democratising groups in the target countries. 91   Robinson has observed the 
‘transnationalisation’ of Democracy Promotion under US leadership, of which the 
network of political foundations promoting democracy is one crucial element.92  
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Conclusion: The Way Forward for EU-US Cooperation on Democracy Promotion 
beyond ‘Venus and Mars’ 
 
Kagan’s provocative thesis of ‘Venus and Mars’ posited America and Europe at two 
diametrically opposed strategic poles. This paper indicates that Democracy Promotion 
is an area that shows potential for intensive US-EU cooperation beyond ‘Venus and 
Mars’. The 2007 US-EU Summit Political Progress Report recognises that “effective 
dialogue – often in advance of policy formulation – has led to convergence on key 
issues”.93 In the area of promoting “peace, human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law worldwide”, the report states that “the effectiveness of our efforts is amplified by 
delivering the same political messages and coordinating possible actions”.94 The EU-US 
‘Dialogue on Democracy Promotion’ is a crucial tool that allows the EU and the US to 
coordinate their separate and joint efforts in global Democracy Promotion on the 
highest political levels. 
 
In spite of these encouraging signs of cooperation, the EU shies away from joint projects 
on the operational level because of the perceived US agenda for Democracy 
Promotion with a focus on short-term regime change and imposing democracy from 
above. The blunt statement of an official of the European Commission exemplifies the 
bleak prospects for EU-US Democracy Promotion cooperation on the operational level: 
“quite frankly, the EU does not want to sacrifice its good name for a Transatlantic 
Agenda on Democracy Promotion”.95 
 
Instead, the ‘food for thought’ paper on the EU approach to Democracy Promotion 
stresses rather the opposites of the short-termism and top-down approach that the US 
allegedly pursues by highlighting the following priorities for EU Democracy Promotion: 
local ownership of Democracy Promotion initiatives, long-term capacity-building, the 
identification of priority states, the mainstreaming of democratic principles in 
development and the holistic nature of Democracy Promotion in conjunction with the 
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promotion of human rights, the rule of law and good governance.96 In this sense, the EU 
has “sought to develop policy initiatives capable of challenging what many see as 
Washington’s pre-eminence in this field”.97  Nonetheless, there might be potential for 
more cooperation. Three ways forward for EU-US cooperation on Democracy Promotion 
will be outlined below. 
 
1) Enhanced Coordination at the Political and Strategic Levels 
This paper showed that there are already some promising bilateral and multilateral 
Democracy Promotion initiatives from which further EU-US cooperation could be 
developed, such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative. The democracy 
support programmes of the US and the EU could be harmonised further to achieve more 
effective coordination. Both the US Millennium Challenge Account98 and the EU’s ENP 
were designed to assist emerging democracies in their efforts to strengthen democratic 
institutions. In geographical areas where both the EU and the US are actively pursuing 
Democracy Promotion policies, such as the Black Sea region, enhanced coordination 
of Democracy Promotion could be beneficial. However, at the moment formal 
coordination does not yet exist even though “the four freedoms of market access, 
labour mobility, investment and travel offered in Europe's Neighbourhood Policy are the 
obvious complement to what the United States can offer in terms of security support 
and developmental aid”.99 Closer coordination with European foundations might also 
be helpful. The example of the Black Sea region shows that there is a huge potential for 
further coordination of transatlantic Democracy Promotion activities, both at the highest 
political level and at the NGO level. 
 
                                                 
96   Council of the EU, ‘The EU Approach To Democracy Promotion In External Relations’, op.cit. 
97   Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs, ‘Themes in European Democracy Promotion’. In The 
European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa, edited by Richard 
Gillespie and Richard Youngs. London: Frank Cass, 2002, p. 5. 
98    The Millennium Challenge Account is the US government’s development fund. See US 
Department of State, ‘Millennium Challenge Account’, usinfo.state.gov/ei/ 
economic_issues/mca.html [31 March 2007]. 
99    Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, ‘The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Region’, Testimony 
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, 8 March 
2005, www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2005/JacksonTestimony050308.pdf [31 March 
2007]. Martin Konstantin Köhring 
  26
2) Enhanced Policy Dialogue with Operational Implications 
If cooperation on the political/strategic level is possible but operational cooperation is 
not forthcoming yet, a middle ground could be provided by enhanced cooperation on 
the policy level. A joint US Institute of Peace-FRIDE 100   workshop on ‘Transatlantic 
Cooperation on Democracy Promotion in the Middle East’ has specifically called for an 
enhanced policy dialogue. To this end, the workshop agreed that “the aim of 
supporting political reform needs to be broken down into more operational issues of 
concern, assisting clear agreement on what kind of change is actually desired”.101  
 
There seems to be ground for optimism that local projects can benefit from enhanced 
policy dialogue. For instance, in the case of Democracy Promotion activities in Jordan, 
the EU and the US were able to develop complementary frameworks of operation 
rather than competitive approaches. Informal cooperation mechanisms have 
emerged, for example in the case of judicial reform in Jordan. Nonetheless, “systematic 
co-ordination has not become part yet of the Western code of conduct in the 
democratic realm”.102 Insofar, an enhanced policy dialogue on Democracy Promotion 
might have significant knock-on effects for operational cooperation and might be the 
way forward for closer cooperation in specific regions. 
 
3) A Joint Strategic Vision: a Transatlantic Democracy Promotion Agenda? 
Even though Commission officials rule out the creation of a joint Transatlantic 
Democracy Promotion Agenda, a strategic convergence in Democracy Promotion can 
be observed in recent years. The American and European Security Strategies both 
emphasise the interrelationship between democracy and peace. The ‘new liberal 
imperialism’ might be a bridge between US and EU strategies but, as shown above, such 
a strategic bridge has not trickled down to the policy or even operational level. In such 
a way, Cooper’s bold calls for a more assertive EU role in the world cannot be 
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understood as an invitation to do more joint Democracy Promotion projects, possibly 
including the use of force, with the US.  
 
In light of the latest challenges to democracy, in particular the global rise of radical 
populism, some commentators argue that “the adoption of a common transatlantic 
democracy promotion agenda that will reconcile the need for supporting democracy 
and the need to reduce the risks of instability caused by the populist revolutions should 
be an essential part of NATO’s response to populism”.103 Thus, despite the sceptical view 
of the Commission, the notion of a Transatlantic Democracy Promotion Agenda will 
remain part of the Democracy Promotion debate as the representation of the most 
optimistic view of the prospects for future transatlantic cooperation in Democracy 
Promotion. 
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